

FEEDBACK



【 航空安全情報自発報告制度（**VOICES**）共有情報 】

一部英訳版

No. 2026 – 01

Aug.21st, 2026

Voluntary and Confidential Incident Reporting System (VOICES) is a safety information reporting system that was launched in fiscal year 2014 as part of the Aviation Safety Program. Its purpose is to collect information on events that may have posed safety concerns—such as so-called "near-miss" incidents—which cannot be fully captured through the Mandatory Reporting System for accidents and incidents. This information is utilized to enhance aviation safety. Some of the reported events, which have been analyzed by a team of experts, are regularly shared as part of the publication titled *FEEDBACK*.

(FEEDBACK No.2026-01-02)

2. Icing Condition Just Before the Start of Winter Operations

Ground school for winter operations began this month, and we are approaching the seasonal transition to the start of winter operations. However, the temperature in Narita is still around 25°C, and on humid days it can still feel warm. Today as well, the temperature at departure from Narita was 27°C. Because of this, I found myself becoming lax in my awareness that we were entering the winter operations period. At Tianjin Airport, the weather was -RA. After completing the Takeoff Briefing and while waiting for boarding to finish, the PIC said to me, "Isn't it about to drop below 10°C?" (the temperature at landing was 15°C). When I checked the WX, it was exactly 10°C. Because of this, we confirmed that we would take off with Engine Anti-Ice ON, and recalculated our takeoff performance. I realized my awareness of the temperature had become dulled.

(FEEDBACK No.2026-01-10)

10. Trap of ECL

The other day, during Taxi, we needed to change the performance, and we recalculated the V Speeds. We carried out the confirmation process as usual, redoing the ECL (Electronic Checklist) from the Before Start Checklist, and completed the process without any issues. However, despite having redone the checklist from the Before Start Checklist, the PF forgot to set the Trim at this time. During taxi, the PM noticed that the Stab Trim value was incorrect, and the PF reset the Stab Trim. There is a Stab Trim item within the ECL's Before Start Checklist, but despite the value being incorrect, that item was displayed as "Complete" (in green text). Since we have not been able to reproduce this in the Simulator, it is unclear whether this was simply a one-off system error or whether it occurs under certain specific conditions. Nonetheless, this made me feel that even the ECL has its pitfalls.

(FEEDBACK No.2026-01-10)

11. Tire Cut


Cut found on number 2 main tire of JA○○○○ during external inspection. Engineering was advised. After an inspection a decision was made by Engineering to change the tire. A safe departure was made after a slight delay.

(FEEDBACK No.2026-01-28)

28. *You'll get sucked into the engine!*

While taxiing our B777-300 into Spot 59 at Haneda Airport from E9, a B787-8 at Spot 58 had just finished

pushback facing North on R, and the Tow Bar was about to be disconnected. The clearance with the B787 was slightly tight, but there was no issue. As we approached the parking spot, I could confirm the Wingman on the right side ahead of us, and confirmed the hand signal indicating no obstacles. The VDGS was also functioning as normal. I could also see another ground staff member standing further back at Spot 59. Looking to the left side, our Wingman was not there, but the Chockman handling the B787's Pushback was giving a standby signal toward the B787 from the normal position 45 degrees in front, and another ground staff member (Headset Operator) was about to move away from the B787's Nose. However, the position where this Chockman was standing giving the standby signal was clearly on the near side of the row of containers at Spot 59, and it appeared to us that he was in a position where he could be sucked into our left engine, so we slowed down (👍). The Chockman was looking toward the B787 and did not seem to notice our approach. At almost the same moment our aircraft stopped, the Wingman on the right side also switched to an emergency stop signal, and the ground staff further back also gave an emergency stop signal. I wonder if it was because we slowed down that they noticed. As far as I recall, the VDGS had not changed. After that, the Chockman evacuated along with the ground staff member who had moved away from the B787's Nose, and the Wingman's hand signal returned to indicating no obstacles, and we completed Block In as normal. Note that after Block In, we were unable to communicate due to an interphone malfunction, and we were only able to speak after deplaning was complete. I verbally requested that this event be shared in order to prevent recurrence. Perhaps because it was daytime with good weather and I was looking for the Wingman, I was able to notice the abnormality (👍). However, if this had occurred at night with rain falling, we might have also had the Taxi Lights off and might not have noticed. In that case, who would have been able to notice the danger approaching the Chockman... It was a frightening moment.



(FEEDBACK No.2026-01-31)


31. *Departing Traffic Not Complying with ATC Instructions*

We were holding short of the runway at ○○ Airport. At that time, a foreign aircraft received takeoff clearance. However, after they commenced the takeoff roll, TWR instructed, "XXXX, Stop." However, they replied "Takeoff" and did not abort the takeoff. Despite TWR subsequently repeating the instruction "XXXX, Stop Immediately" three or four times, the aircraft continued to disregard it. After the aircraft had already gained a certain amount of speed, it responded "Continue," and TWR then issued "Cleared for Takeoff." The reason TWR had issued the Stop instruction remains unknown.

(FEEDBACK No.2026-01-33)

33. Intersection Misidentification During Departure

During departure from Hakodate Airport, we requested an intersection departure from T6, but mistakenly entered T5 instead. Possible contributing factors include the fact that T5 already felt sufficiently far down the 3,000m runway, the slope of the taxiway, and our preoccupation with recovering from a delay. I also believe that, as PM, my reduced vigilance regarding the PF's turn intention meant that my monitoring function was not working at all. On this occasion, the controller pointed out that our current position was T5 (👍), so we stopped short of the runway, recalculated the takeoff performance, and then took off. It is frightening to think what might have happened had we taken off using the T6 takeoff performance data without receiving that call-out. We were saved by TWR. For reference, I would also mention Nagasaki Airport as another airport where a similar error could easily occur, given its long runway and a ramp area located near the end of the runway/field.



(FEEDBACK No.2026-01-45)

45. Air traffic control instruction error during TAXI

After landing on TSN (RWY 16L), we received taxi clearance: Our taxi via P C and hold short of C3. But approaching C2, we recognized one A/C coming from right (on C2) any going to B, so conflicting with our taxiing. So, we stopped taxiing (even according to ATC clearance, we was supposed to be No.1 on taxi) and make the A/C pass in front of us. We request ATC about information of happening and they apologize about their mistake (ATC mistake was they instruct us to hold C3 instead of C2)



(FEEDBACK No.2026-01-72)

72. VFR Traffic Approaching During Descent

While we were on approach to Odate-Noshiro Airport, we identified a threat at a briefing—"We'll decelerate by MAGGY to avoid going deeper than a 3° flight path and descend using V/S mode"—and shared our countermeasure within the cockpit.

ATC: "Descend and maintain 8,000 until MAGGY, then cleared for RNP Z RWY 29 Approach."

Suddenly, a VFR aircraft appeared, climbing toward MAGGY and continued to climb even after passing 6,000 ft.

ATC: "IFR traffic on approach. Avoid to the west side."

(👍)

Shirakami Approach called out to the VFR aircraft repeatedly, but they didn't respond. The aircraft was still climbing past 8,000 ft. We considered turning toward NOSSY, but heading directly toward it would prolong a head-on situation, and we didn't know how high the aircraft would climb.

"When two aircraft are approaching head-on or nearly head-on, each shall alter its course to the right." (Civil Aeronautics Regulations Article 182)

However, holding at MAGGY requires a right turn. While we were considering this option:



ATC instructed us, "Stop descent, maintain 11,000 ft, hold over MAGGY." Shortly after we turned south: VFR Aircraft: "IFR traffic in sight. Maintain visual separation."

Wait a second—the ones who actually ensured separation were Shirakami Approach and us! We failed to identify this oncoming VFR threat beforehand, resulting in an ad-hoc, reactive response.

(FEEDBACK No.2026-01-86)

86. CAT II Approach with Gusty Winds

A cold wave during New Year holidays was forecast to flow from the Hokuriku toward the Sea of Japan side of Hokkaido. At departure, the company forecasted no snow removal operations and the RWYCC to remain at 5. We selected Haneda Airport as our alternate airfield, taking passenger handling into consideration.

During cruise, radar echoes began moving in, snowfall started, and the RWYCC deteriorated. We received an ACARS update indicating the runway would be closed for snow sweep until 15 minutes prior to our arrival. After the snow sweep, the RWYCC was reported as 5, but the runway was covered in ice and snow, and a NOTAM indicated that ILS RWY 24 was downgraded to CAT II. Considering the time required for Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) to take effect after snow removal, we reduced speed in cruise toward Aomori.

A preceding aircraft was holding over Aomori VOR and we were No. 2 for the approach. Once LVP came into force, we commenced the CAT II approach. However, weather echoes persisted, and winds were gusty. On final, strong winds caused significant airspeed fluctuations, keeping the autothrottle constantly active. The PM reviewed procedures for windshear recovery, and we continued the approach.

We had the runway in sight from around 1,000 ft AGL, but continued despite gusty conditions reported by the Tower and near decision height. The autopilot tracked the localizer well, but near DH, a crosswind from the right drifted us toward the left side of the centerline. The autopilot repeatedly made minor corrections to prevent further drift, and the aircraft landed normally on the right side of the centerline.

Key takeaways from this flight:

1. High-Category Approach in Gusts: It is difficult to judge whether to continue or go around when drifted to about one-third of the runway width off-center at DH due to wind.
2. Autopilot Corrections: The autopilot cannot execute S-turns (corrections in an S-shaped path to maintain the centerline), which risks a touchdown on the opposite side of the centerline.
3. Autopilot Precision: The autopilot maintains precise control through touchdown, demonstrating high accuracy.

Given these factors, deciding whether to continue a CAT II approach under gusty conditions is challenging. Establishing standard procedures—supported by simulator training that prioritizes safety margins—would be highly beneficial.

(FEEDBACK No.2026-01-92)

92. Caution Regarding Similar Call Signs (Part 2)

Flights XX733/736 (KIX - GMP) and XX767/768 (NGO - GMP) overlap in their operating time frames, requiring extreme caution. Measures such as changing call signs should be considered.

XX736 (GMP - KIX) and XX768 (GMP - NGO) are particularly prone to confusion. In this instance, we were operating XX736, and XX768 took off a few minutes ahead of us.

After takeoff, XX736 was instructed to "Maintain 5,000 ft." We were aware of a departure from Incheon Airport RWY 33L positioned northwest at 5,500 ft. Normally, we would expect an instruction like "Climb 7,000 ft, cancel level restriction," but this time ATC issued: "Climb FL230, cancel level restriction." Since our readback was correct, the controller raised no concerns, and the moment passed naturally.

However, as the Incheon departure continued to climb and approach us, we should have questioned whether this was safe. We made an overly optimistic assumption, assuming separation would be fine once given a direct clearance to TK130.

At that point, the flight crew of XX768 confirmed to ATC out of suspicion. "Departure, XX768, confirm climb FL230?" (👍) The moment we heard this, everything clicked—ATC had mistakenly issued the FL230 clearance intended for XX768 to us (XX736). Immediately after, ATC instructed us: "XX736, climb 7,000 ft, cancel level restriction." We were still climbing, passing around 5,000 ft at the time.

Ultimately, we were able to level off at 7,000 ft and avert a dangerous situation. We were truly saved by the vigilance of the XX768 crew.